Partiality, situations and branching time by Del Prete, Fabio
Partiality, situations and branching
time
Workshop Correlating possibilities (satellite workshop of OASIS 2)
University of Nantes, October 14-15 2019
Fabio Del Prete
CLLE-ERSS (CNRS & Université de Toulouse 2)
1
Overview
1. I want to talk about a notion of partiality and show its relevance to a
number of phenomena from the domain of modality.
2. A Kratzerian view on situations as parts of possible worlds.
3. An Austinian view on situations as the stuff we talk about (topic situations).
Time is an abstraction and need not be assumed as a separate ontological
category.
4. A view of situations as branching to the future.
1. Tarski, States of Affairs, Possible Worlds
Picture 1. The state of 
affairs M(ug)o(n)D(esk).
(a) The mug is on the desk.
[Uttered in actual context c1.]
 Tarski (in context):
(T) Sentence (a) (as uttered in c1) is true
if and only if 
the mug (referred to by the speaker of c1) is
on the desk (referred to by the speaker of c1).
The condition in boldface in (T) stands in for a
particular (possible) state of affairs—call it ‘MoD’.
(a) The mug is on the desk.
 Standard Truth Conditions in formal semantics:
(TC) [[ (a) ]]c, g, @ = 1 iff @  [[ (a) ]]c, g.
iff @  {w: [[ the mug ]]c, g, w is on [[ the desk ]]c, g, w in w}.
• How does the Tarski story fit with (TC)?
 (TC) makes explicit reference to an evaluation index @ (a possible world), thus
relativizing truth to such an index.
 I prefer however to understand (TC) as introducing a world as subject of a
predication: the subject @ is a world w such that the mug is on the desk in w.
Picture 1. The state of 
affairs MoD. 
• In formal semantics, states of affairs like MoD
are modelled as a possible world being member
of a set of possible worlds / having a certain
property (of possible worlds);
 MoD is modelled as the world @ being member
of the set of those possible worlds in which the
mug in question is on the desk in question—call
this set ‘XMoD’.
 Tarski (Possible Worlds jargon):
(TPW) Sentence (a) (as uttered in c1) is true iff
the actual world is a member of XMoD.
• A problem.  This approach does not distinguish between a and -():
(a) (At this moment) The mug is on the desk.
() (#At this moment) The mug is made of ceramics.
() (#At this moment) Water is H20.
 a concerns a “temporally small” situation;
  and () cannot possibly concern a small situation:  concerns a
situation (containing the mug and the property of being made of
ceramics) co-extensive with the mug’s life span, and () concerns the
maximal actual situation, i.e. the actual world @. (Maybe not the whole
actual world but only a temporally maximal situation that includes all the
water there is and nothing else. I will put this issue aside.)
• Only generics such as () involve properties of whole worlds (and so,
only generics make the classical formal semantics representation of
truth conditions fully appropriate).
• A historical note. Lewis (1979) made a close point in his article on De
Se attitudes: attitudes such as belief, traditionally conceived as
propositional (i.e., their objects would be classical propositions—sets
of possible worlds), sometimes take properties as their objects, where
properties need not be homogeneously true (or false) throughout a
whole world and are rather instantiated “locally”.
• Here we think of Lewis’ properties as nothing more and nothing less
than propositions in the generalized sense of properties of possible
situations.
2. Kratzerian Situations, Austinian Topic Situations, 
Fully Specific Propositions
• Kratzerian situations are partial worlds (i.e., parts of possible worlds).
(a) The mug is on the desk.
• M(inimal)-truth (Kratzer 2019)
The proposition (of the c1-utterance of) (a) is M(inimally)-true in a situation s1
that only contains:
i. the mug,
ii. the desk,
iii. information regarding the spatial relation between the desk and the mug.
• We will also say that s1 is the “minimal situation” in which (a) is true and that s1
is the situation that (a) concerns.
• Kratzer (1989) assumes a principle of Persistence:
Persistence
If (a) is true in a situation s and s is a part of a situation s’ (s  s’), then (a)
is true in s’.
 Kratzer abstracts away from time: in her statement of Persistence, s  s’
means that s’ is an extension of s that is synchronous with s.
 By Persistence, since (a) (as uttered in c1) is true in the (actual) situation
s1 depicted in Picture 1, it is also true in the maximal situation @ that is
our world (since s1  @).
Given what we said about the difference between (a) (The mug is on
the desk) and () (Water is H2O), what would it mean that (a) (as
uttered in c1) is true in @?
Aren’t we falling back onto the problem raised by the classical possible
worlds picture of propositions?
• Persistence (time added). If (a) is true in a situation s and s is a part of a
situation s’ that extends s in time/space, then (a) is true in s’.
• M-truth corresponds to the concept of a proposition concerning a situation
and does not satisfy Persistence.
(Except possibly for generics: if generics are M-true in worlds, then M-truth
of generics satisfies Persistence in a trivial way.)
• The notion of truth that does satisfy Persistence (call it P-truth) corresponds
to a concept of a-temporal / a-locational truth: since the proposition of (a)’s
utterance in c1 is M-true somewhere (i.e., in s1), it is P-true in every situation
that has s1 as a part (in particular, it is P-true in the possible world @).
“P-true in a situation s” means “M-true somewhere within s”.
• Persistence only works upward (not downward!)
on the part-of structure. So, from the fact that (a)
(as uttered in c1) is P-true in our world @, it does
not follow that it is P-true in the situation s2  @
depicted in Picture 2.
• Notice that in s2 (a) (as uttered in a context c2 
c1) is true. But in this case we have a different
proposition!
 In c1 (a) was addressed to my office-mate to
instruct her on the whereabouts of the mug I had
borrowed from her.
 In c2 (a) was addressed to my daughter to let her
know where in our apartment I saw her favourite
mug.
Picture 2. MoD2
Different mugs, 
different desks, 
different moments in 
the temporal flow … 
Different situations!
Picture 1. “The mug is 
on the desk” in c1.
Picture 2. “The mug 
is on the desk” in c2.
• I am in a context c3, one year after c2. I tell my daughter “the mug is
on the desk”, referring to the same mug and to the same desk as in c2.
• Is the proposition expressed by my c3-utterance true in the old
situation s2?
• This time the identity of the mug and the desk does not pose a
problem—the mug and the desk I am referring to in c3 are the same
mug and the same desk contained in s2.
• However, while s2 was in 2018, the minimal situation s3 in which (a)
(as uttered in c3) is true is a situation in 2019.
• Minimal situation s3 in 2019
verifying the proposition of my
c3-utterance of (a)
• Situations are particulars:
a situation in which the mug is
on the desk one year ago is not
the same as a situation in which
the mug is on the desk today.
Picture 3. “The mug is on the desk” in c3.
• A triviality. In the new context c3, to say something true of the old
situation s2 I should use a different sentence:
(a’) The mug is on the desk and it was on the desk that time too.
The boldfaced part of (a’) (as uttered in c3) expresses the same
proposition as (a) (as was uttered in c2).
(The parts “that time” and “too” do not contribute anything to this
proposition and their only role is to contribute to discourse coherence.)
• A question/objection. Why are you going so particular? Propositions
(like concepts) are general: they typically apply to different situations.
Your situations s2, s3 are both correctly described by the proposition
that the mug is on the desk.
• Reply. Propositions are M-true in situations and those situations in
which they are M-true are what they concern—those situations are
constituents of the propositions, if you like.
(To say that (a) as-uttered-in-c2 and (a) as-uttered-in-c3 express the
same proposition would be like saying that John is tall and Bill is tall
express the same proposition because they involve the ascription of
the same property to an individual.)
• (a) as-uttered-in-c2 and (a) as-uttered-in-c3 concern different
situations and so they are different propositions.
• In conclusion: the propositions are different since they encompass
different (though resembling) situations:
s2 is such that the mug is on the desk = p
s3 is such that the mug is on the desk = p'
• I give an example of propositional identity from Amaral & Del Prete (2016) study on
Portuguese afinal and Italian alla fine (‘in the end’) as markers of “truth unpersistence”:
(A) [Uttered on Friday:] I will go to the theatre on Sunday.
(B) [Uttered on the following Monday:] In the end I did not go to the theatre.
• Operators like “in the end” mark the unpersistence of the truth of a backgrounded
proposition:
“This notion [of truth unpersistence] captures a basic fact concerning felicitous and
truthful utterances of [sentences as in (B)]: they require that the truth of a proposition
p∗ fail to persist through a temporal succession of epistemic states, where p∗ is
incompatible with the proposition modified by [in the end] (hereafter, the “prejacent”).”
[Amaral & Del Prete (2016)]
(A) [Uttered on Friday] I will go to the theatre on Sunday.
(B) [Uttered on the following Monday] In the end I did not go to the theatre.
• For the utterance in (B) to make sense, the prejacent of “in the end” must be
factually incompatible with the same proposition that was previously entertained—
the proposition of the utterance in (A).
• In spite of (A) being future tensed and (B) past tensed, the proposition in (A) and
the proposition with which the prejacent of “in the end” in (B) is factually
incompatible are the same proposition.
(F) [[ will(p) ]]c, g, s = 1 iff (c < s) and p is M-true in s
iff (c < s) and s  [[ p ]]c, g
(P) [[ past(p) ]]c, g, s = 1 iff (s < c) and p is M-true in s
iff (s < c) and s  [[ p ]]c, g
• The underlined conditions in (F) and (P) (i.e., the temporal relations between topic
situation and utterance situation marked by the tense) do not contribute to the pure
propositions expressed by an utterance of “will(p)” / “past(p)”.
• As far as their propositional content is concerned, “will(p)” and “past(p)” do not differ
from one another (provided that they concern the same situation).
• “will(p)” and “past(p)” only differ in their use-conditions (the place of the speaker with
respect to the topic situation has changed in passing from one context to the other).
(NOTE. If you are not happy with this “flat” analysis of past vs. future, I’ll be back to the
future later on.)
• Question. What sort of semantic object is the one obtained via
abstraction over the situation?
s. s is such that the mug is on the desk
 It is the sort of compositional object we need to compute the meaning
of sentences like () and ():
() The mug is always on the desk
(you always forget to put it back in the kitchen!)
() The mug must be on the desk
(1. I saw it there this morning. / 2. The house rules dictate so.)
3. Open Propositions, Intra-World vs. Cross-World 
Relations Between Situations
• We must distinguish between:
i. propositions as the semantic objects that get transmitted in
communication and are built and identified in concrete utterances,
ii. “proposition-like” entities (propositional functions, if you like) that
are needed for compositional semantics purposes (see Rabern
2012).
() The mug is always on the desk
(you always forget to put it back in the kitchen!)
• The intuition about (): it concerns a temporally large situation sbig.
• “Always” quantifies over situations (from a context set C) that are parts of the
situation sbig:
[[ AlwaysC ]]
c, g, sbig = p<s,t>. s'C (s'  sbig  p(s') = 1)
[[ ^[the mug is on the desk] ]]c, g, sbig = ss. (s is such that mug is on desk)
[[ [AlwaysC ^[the mug is on the desk]] ]]
c, g, sbig = 1 iff s'C (s'  sbig  s' is
such that mug is on desk)
() The mug must be on the desk
(Context 1. I saw it there this morning. / Context 2. The house rules dictate so.)
• The intuition about (): in Context 1 it concerns a small situation but in
Context 2 it concerns a large situation.
• “Must” quantifies over situations that are related to the concerned (topic)
situation via some intra- or cross-world relation f:
[[ must ]]c, g, s = p<s,t>. s' (s'  f(s)  p(s') = 1)
[[ ^[the mug is on the desk] ]]c, g, s = ss. (s is such that the mug is on the
desk)
[[ [Must ^[the mug is on the desk]] ]]c, g, s = 1 iff s' (s'  f(s)  s' is such
that the mug is on the desk)
(1) The mug must be on the desk. (I saw it there this morning.)
The situation concerned is a small evidential situation s0 containing the
speaker and relevant information accessible to her from which she infers
that the mug is on the desk.
In (1)’s truth condition:
s' (s'  f(s0)  s' is such that the mug is on the desk)
f(s0) is a set of situations that, in light of the evidence in s0, might be the
actual situation; f is not a cross-world relation because the situations in
f(s0) are candidates for an actual situation in @. (See Santorio 2012.)
(2) The mug must be on the desk. (The house rules dictate so.)
The situation concerned is a large normative situation s0 consisting of
certain rules that provide that the mug be on the desk.
In (2)’s truth condition:
s' (s'  f(s0)  s' is such that the mug is on the desk)
f(s0) is a set of situations that comply with the relevant rules; f is a cross-
world relation because the situations in f(s0) are (also) situations from
non-actual worlds (cf. “The mug must be on the desk, but you never put
it back there!”).
4. SITUATIONS IN BRANCHING TIME
Branching Time (BT): many futures, one past
(Prior 1967, Thomason 1984, Belnap et al. 2001)
• Our world, considered at any moment m, has a unique fixed past and
present (the past and the present at m) and many open futures (the
possible futures at m).
A suitable representation of our world, as it is at a moment m, depicts it
as the cluster of all histories passing through m.
PAST FUTURE(S)
m
m''
m'
h1
h2
h4
h3
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Branching Situations (Partial BT)
• A variant of Branching Time based on situations (called Partial Branching Time in
Del Prete 2012): every situation comes with a unique past history but may evolve
into a number of alternative situations.
• For any situations s1, s2, the formula ‘s1 £S s2’ means that s1 did occur from the
perspective of s2, while s2 might occur from the perspective of s1 (Belnap 1992),
the occurrence of s2 being expected given some relevant facts in s1 and its past.
• Histories are maximal chains of causally connected situations.
• A world is always a world at a particular situation: the world at s, world(s), is the
set of all histories passing through s.
Future tense in PBT:
“Peircean” approach (Prior 1967)
• [[ will(p) ]]c, g, cs = 1 iff h (cs  h s'  h (s’ > cs & [[ p ]]
c, g, s’ = 1))
p h1
cs
PAST p h2 FUTURE(S)
will(p)                         p
h3
 On this approach, future tensed sentences are essentially necessity modal
sentences p (Condoravdi 2003): they make a claim about the present and require
to check the truth of their open prejacent p relative to a number of alternative
world-histories accessible from the present situation.
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Future tense in PBT: 
“Ockhamist” approach (Prior 1967)
• [[ will(p) ]]c, g, cs = 1 iff s'  TRL(cs) (s’ > cs & [[ p ]]
c, g, s’ = 1))
([[ will(p) ]]c, g is true in cs if and only if p is true at an s' following cs on the
history h* that will be actual after cs – the Thin Red Line of cs)
s' h*
cs p
PAST h2 FUTURE(S)
will(p)
h3
➢ Although there are many possible futures, only one will be actual. A future
tensed statement concerns this only future.
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• The Peircean approach makes justice to the modal uses of the future
(Condoravdi 2003), but it faces some problems with negation and
indefinites:
(in the following I will make use of parameterized choice functions 
to analyse indefinites; a choice-function term “(N, w)” picks out an
individual that is N in w)
Modals/Future and indefinites (Stalnaker’s asymmetry)
() President Carter has to appoint a woman to the Supreme Court,
but he doesn't have to appoint any particular woman; he just has to appoint
some woman or other. [from Stalnaker 1981]
(') (s1 f(s0)) (s1 is such that Carter appoints (woman, world(s1)))
BUT ’ (s1 f(s0)) (s1 is such that Carter appoints ’(woman, world(s0)))
() President Carter will appoint a woman to the Supreme Court,
#but he won't appoint any particular woman; he just will appoint some
woman or other. [from Stalnaker 1981]
(') (h1 s0 h1) (s1 > s0 & s1  h1) (s1 is such that Carter appoints (woman,
world(s1)))
BUT (h1 s0  h1) ’ (s1 > s0 & s1  h1) (s1 is such that Carter appoints
’(woman, world(s0)))
Modals/Future and negation
• The  lexically introduced by must can scopally interact with negation, as in (-b), (-c):
() a. He must not come to the party.
b. (s1  f(s0)) (s1 is such that (he comes to the party)) 
c. (s1  f(s0)) (s1 is such that he comes to the party)
• On the other hand, the  over histories in the “Peircean” interpretation of will(p) cannot
scopally interact with negation (see the unavailability of narrow scope in (-c)):
() a. He will not come to the party.
b. (h s0  h) (s1 > s0 & s1  h) (s1 is such that he comes to the party)
c. (h s0  h) (s1 > s0 & s1  h) (s1 is such that he comes to the party)
• Universal quantification underlying the “will” future does not seem to
be able to enter scope relations with other scope bearing elements.
• In the past, I took this behaviour as evidence that this quantification is
not contributed by any element overtly realized in the sentence and is
due to a pragmatic strategy: a supervaluation to overcome the
plurality of possible future histories that are relevant to evaluate the
utterance (Del Prete 2014).
• “Modal Forcing” – not just with future tensed sentences! (Spolaore & Del Prete 2019):
(a) Now Yohan Blake will win. [Uttered after Usain Bolt has been disqualied.]
(b) Now you committed a crime last year. [Uttered after the new ex post facto law.]
(c) Now Pluto is not a planet anymore. [Uttered after the relevant conceptual shift has occurred.]
(d) Now it was an asteroid and not climate change that killed dinosaurs. [Uttered after the relevant
theory-change has occurred.]
Modal interpretations of will as a particular case of Modal Forcing? (Context-situation forces the
topic situation.)
• Narrative contexts in the “historical present”:
(e) 1941 - Richard Cheney is born in Lincoln, Nebraska, on January 30th. He will grow up in Casper,
Wyoming, and earn his bachelor's and master's of arts degrees from the University of Wyoming.
The purely temporal (“Ockhamist”) will appears from examples like (e), where the narrated events
are located in the past (in spite of being reported in the present tense) and the narrator has complete
information about the relevant sequence of events. (Transposition in the past tense of (e) would
show a parallel purely temporal would.)
Conclusion
• A partial semantics based on situations and a relation of minimal truth
between propositions and situations capturing the intuition that a
proposition concerns a situation (its topic situation).
• Propositions in actual communication are completely specific (they are not
open propositions that are evaluated relative to times or worlds).
• Open propositions are needed for compositional semantics purposes – we
need them in order to compute the meaning of sentences containing
modals and other quantificational operators.
• Situation semantics allows a simple take on propositional contents of our
utterances (ultimately there might be no semantic difference between the
past tense “I went to the theatre on Sunday” and the future tense “I will go
to the theatre on Sunday”, when the two utterances refer to the same
situation).
[[ Thank you! ]]here, now
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